"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), majority opinion
A state legislature passes a law requiring all public school students to recite a loyalty oath to the state government. Which of the following best explains how the principle in the passage would apply to a challenge to this law?
- AThe oath is valid because the passage restrains only federal officials, and the Tenth Amendment reserves public school policy to the states
- BThe oath is unconstitutional because it establishes an official state religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids
- CThe oath violates free speech because government may not force citizens to profess beliefs, a protection incorporated against the statesCorrect
- DThe oath is permissible unless reciting it creates a clear and present danger of lawless action by students
Why C is right
The passage says that no official, "high or petty," may prescribe orthodoxy in politics or nationalism or force citizens "to confess by word or act their faith therein." A required loyalty oath to the state is exactly that kind of forced confession of political belief. In Barnette the Court treated compelled speech as a violation of the First Amendment's free speech protection. Through selective incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, that protection binds state governments and public schools as well as Congress. So the principle in the passage directly supports striking down the state oath requirement.
Why the other 3 choices miss
- A
- Incorrect because the passage covers every official, "high or petty," not only federal ones, and the First Amendment has been incorporated against the states. The Tenth Amendment's reserved powers do not let a state override constitutional rights, even in education policy.
- B
- Incorrect because the passage mentions religion only as one example of orthodoxy. A loyalty oath to the state government is a compelled political profession, not the establishment of a religion, so the Establishment Clause is not the governing principle.
- D
- Incorrect because the clear and present danger test (Schenck) concerns when government may punish speech that threatens harm. It does not address forcing people to speak, and the passage forbids compelled professions of belief whether or not any danger is present.
The table shows hypothetical data on four public speeches given in the same city.
| Speaker | Did the speech urge listeners to break the law? | When the speech urged the unlawful acts | Listeners present | Listeners who committed unlawful acts within one hour |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Speaker 1 | Yes | At some unspecified point in the future | 2,000 | 0 |
| Speaker 2 | Yes | Immediately, at a nearby building | 300 | 85 |
| Speaker 3 | No (criticized city officials) | Not applicable | 500 | 120 |
| Speaker 4 | Yes | Immediately, at a nearby building | 4 | 0 |
Based on the data in the table, which speaker's speech could most likely be punished under the standard the Supreme Court set in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)?
- ASpeaker 1, because that speech urged unlawful acts before the largest audience shown in the table
- BSpeaker 3, because more listeners committed unlawful acts after that speech than after any other
- CSpeaker 2, because that speech urged immediate unlawful acts and many listeners actedCorrect
- DSpeaker 4, because that speech urged listeners to break the law right now
Why C is right
Under Brandenburg v. Ohio, the government may punish speech only if it is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action AND is likely to produce such action. In the table, only Speaker 2 meets both conditions: the speech urged unlawful acts immediately, and its effect on 85 of 300 listeners shows the speech was likely to produce lawless action. Speaker 1 advocated lawbreaking only at an unspecified future time, which is protected abstract advocacy. Speaker 3's speech did not urge lawbreaking at all. Speaker 4 urged immediate lawbreaking to only 4 listeners, none of whom acted, so the likelihood prong is not met.
Why the other 3 choices miss
- A
- Misreads audience size as the test. Speaker 1 advocated lawbreaking only at some future time, so the speech fails the imminence requirement no matter how large the crowd was.
- B
- Treats the number of later unlawful acts as enough on its own. Speaker 3's speech did not urge anyone to break the law, so it was not directed to inciting lawless action, and it stays protected even though listeners later acted unlawfully.
- D
- Applies only the imminence prong. Speaker 4 urged immediate lawbreaking, but with 4 listeners and none acting, the speech was not likely to produce lawless action, which Brandenburg also requires.