The table shows hypothetical data from a panel survey that asked the same voters to describe their party identification, recorded how they voted for the U.S. House, and asked them again four years later.
| Party identification | Share of electorate | Voted for own party's House candidate | Same identification four years later |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strong Democrat | 20% | 94% | 91% |
| Weak Democrat | 14% | 81% | 72% |
| Independent, leans Democratic | 12% | 84% | 65% |
| Pure independent | 10% | n/a | 48% |
| Independent, leans Republican | 12% | 83% | 63% |
| Weak Republican | 13% | 79% | 70% |
| Strong Republican | 19% | 95% | 92% |
Which of the following statements is supported by the data in the table?
- AIndependents who leaned toward a party backed its House candidates at higher rates than that party's weak identifiers didCorrect
- BWeak identifiers with each party backed its House candidates at higher rates than independents leaning toward it did
- CRepublican identifiers at every level of strength backed their party's House candidates more often than Democratic identifiers at the same level did
- DIndependents leaning toward a party were more likely than that party's weak identifiers to report the same identification four years later
Why A is right
In the table's vote column, Democratic leaners voted for Democratic House candidates at 84% versus 81% for weak Democrats, and Republican leaners voted for Republican House candidates at 83% versus 79% for weak Republicans, so for both parties the leaners were the more loyal voters. This fits the idea that party identification is a psychological attachment rather than a formal label: many self-described independents act like partisans. The other statements misread the table: B reverses the vote comparison, C holds only for the strong-identifier rows, and D applies the vote pattern to the stability column, where leaners were actually less stable (65% and 63%) than weak identifiers (72% and 70%).
Why the other 3 choices miss
- B
- Reverses the comparison in the vote column: weak Democrats (81%) and weak Republicans (79%) backed their party's House candidates at LOWER rates than Democratic leaners (84%) and Republican leaners (83%).
- C
- Generalizes from the strong-identifier row only: strong Republicans (95%) edged strong Democrats (94%), but weak Republicans (79%) trailed weak Democrats (81%) and Republican leaners (83%) trailed Democratic leaners (84%).
- D
- Reads the wrong column: leaners were more loyal in their House vote, but in the stability column they were LESS likely than weak identifiers to keep the same identification (65% vs. 72% for Democrats, 63% vs. 70% for Republicans).
Which of the following best describes the 'partisan sorting' phenomenon that has increased in the United States since the 1970s?
- AVoters increasingly splitting their tickets, choosing candidates from different parties for different offices on the same ballot
- BIdeological liberals increasingly identifying as Democrats and conservatives as Republicans, reducing cross-party ideological overlapCorrect
- CIncreasing numbers of independents refusing to identify with either party, creating a sorted middle group separate from party identifiers
- DPolitical parties increasingly sorting their candidates by region, with Republicans dominating the South and Democrats dominating urban areas
Why B is right
Partisan sorting refers to the alignment of ideological with partisan identity — liberals moving to the Democratic Party and conservatives to the Republican Party. Before the 1970s, both parties contained internal ideological diversity (conservative Southern Democrats, liberal Northeast Republicans). Sorting has reduced this overlap; now the most conservative Democrat is more liberal than the most liberal Republican in Congress, creating the polarized landscape of today.
Why the other 3 choices miss
- A
- Incorrect because split-ticket voting describes behavior that has actually DECREASED with sorting; sorting and straight-ticket voting increase together.
- C
- Incorrect because growing independents reflects dealignment, not sorting; sorting is about the alignment of existing party identifiers with the corresponding ideological label — not movement toward independence.
- D
- Incorrect because geographic sorting is real but is a consequence of partisan sorting, not the definition; partisan sorting specifically refers to the alignment of ideology and party identity, not just geographic distribution.
The table shows hypothetical data from a survey of adults. For each age group, it shows the percentage of respondents whose party identification matches the partisan leaning of each source.
| Source | Ages 18-24 | Ages 40-54 | Ages 65+ |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parents | 71% | 57% | 52% |
| Close friends | 54% | 62% | 60% |
| Spouse or partner | 38% | 69% | 73% |
| Preferred news source | 47% | 63% | 70% |
Which of the following statements is supported by the data in the table?
- AMatch with parents declines with each older age group, while match with every other source is higher among those 65 and older than among those aged 18 to 24.Correct
- BAmong those aged 40 to 54, match with close friends exceeds match with parents by a wider margin than it does among those 65 and older.
- CMatch with the preferred news source rises steadily with age and is the highest of any source among respondents 65 and older.
- DMatch with a spouse or partner is lowest among those aged 18 to 24 and rises with age, but it never exceeds match with parents.
Why A is right
Read across the rows of the table. Match with parents falls from 71% to 57% to 52%. Among those 65 and older, every other source is higher than among those aged 18 to 24: close friends 60 vs. 54, spouse or partner 73 vs. 38, and news source 70 vs. 47. Choice A is the only statement that fits all the numbers. The pattern illustrates political socialization: the family is the dominant early agent, especially for party identification, and later agents such as peers, partners, media, and life experiences gain influence over a person's lifetime.
Why the other 3 choices miss
- B
- Misreads the margins. Friends exceed parents by 5 points (62 vs. 57) among those aged 40 to 54 but by 8 points (60 vs. 52) among those 65 and older, so the gap is wider in the older group.
- C
- The news-source figures do rise steadily (47, 63, 70), but among those 65 and older the spouse or partner row (73%) is higher than the news source (70%). This choice reads the wrong row as the maximum.
- D
- The spouse or partner row is lowest among the young (38%) and rises with age, but it exceeds the parents row among those aged 40 to 54 (69 vs. 57) and among those 65 and older (73 vs. 52).