Moscow's use of military force to reverse political change inside its own bloc — East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 — and beyond it in Afghanistan from December 1979. Leonid Brezhnev supplied the doctrine in 1968 to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia: the USSR claimed a right to intervene wherever socialist rule appeared threatened. Hungary in 1956 was an earlier intervention under Nikita Khrushchev, and the doctrine only rationalized it after the fact.
Why it matters
Each intervention exposed the gap between what the USSR said and what it did. Moscow described the bloc as a voluntary fraternity of socialist nations, then sent tanks against communists. Afghanistan then turned the mechanism against its author: the CIA armed the mujahideen, including with Stinger missiles from 1986, and a decade of casualties and spending drained the Soviet state until withdrawal in February 1989.
How the exam tests it
Prague Spring passages naming Alexander Dubcek, 'socialism with a human face', and the August 21, 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion ask which policy the response reflected; the answer is the Brezhnev Doctrine. Hungary appears through Imre Nagy's November 1, 1956 declaration of neutrality, and the credited answer names the contradiction between claiming a voluntary socialist community and crushing reform by force.
Don’t confuse it with
Do not blur Hungary 1956 with Czechoslovakia 1968. Nagy tried to leave the Warsaw Pact and declare neutrality; Dubcek explicitly kept Czechoslovakia in the Pact and committed to socialism, and Soviet forces invaded anyway, which is what makes 1968 the sharper illustration of the doctrine.