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AP U.S. Government and Politics · Civil Liberties and Civil Rights

Employment Division v Smith

Employment Division v Smith appears in 4 reviewed AP U.S. Government and Politics questions and sits in Civil Liberties and Civil Rights. Below are worked examples showing exactly how the exam tests it, with the answer marked and every distractor explained.

Employment Division v. Smith (1990) held that a neutral, generally applicable law can be enforced against religious practice without a religious exemption. Oregon denied unemployment benefits to two men fired for using peyote in a Native American Church ceremony, and the Court upheld the denial.

Why it matters

Smith narrowed the Free Exercise Clause, because the government no longer needs a compelling interest to burden religion through a general law. Congress pushed back with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (1993), which restored strict scrutiny by statute. The Court answered in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), ruling that RFRA could not be applied to the states, so it binds only the federal government.

How the exam tests it

Questions give several laws and ask which can be enforced against a religious group. Under Smith, a law is treated as neutral and generally applicable only if it does not single out religion and does not exempt comparable secular conduct. Such a law needs only a rational basis. A law that targets religious rituals must pass strict scrutiny, which it almost always fails, as in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993). Public support or the law's age does not matter.

Don’t confuse it with

Students mix up Smith with Sherbert v. Verner (1963), but Sherbert required strict scrutiny for burdens on religion, while Smith limits that strict test mostly to laws that target religion or allow case-by-case exemptions. Smith did not overrule Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), which let Amish parents take their children out of school after eighth grade. It distinguished Yoder as a case that joined free exercise with parents' rights.

Employment Division v Smith in real questions

Example 1Harder
The table shows hypothetical data on four city ordinances regulating the slaughter of animals. Each ordinance is challenged by a religious group whose ceremonies include animal sacrifice. | Ordinance | Year enacted | Activity covered | Secular exemptions written into the law | Public support (%) | |---|---|---|---|---| | P | 1785 | Slaughter performed as part of a religious ceremony | 0 | 81 | | Q | 2015 | All slaughter of animals within city limits | 0 | 48 | | R | 1990 | All slaughter of animals within city limits | 5 | 74 | | S | 1960 | All slaughter of animals within city limits | 1 | 66 | Based on the table and the standard the Supreme Court applied in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which ordinance could the city most likely enforce against the religious group without granting it a religious exemption?
  1. AOrdinance P, enacted in 1785 and backed by 81 percent of residents
  2. BOrdinance Q, enacted in 2015 and supported by 48 percent of residentsCorrect
  3. COrdinance R, enacted in 1990 and backed by 74 percent of residents
  4. DOrdinance S, enacted in 1960 and backed by 66 percent of residents

Why B is right

Under Employment Division v. Smith (1990), a law that burdens religious practice can be enforced without a religious exemption if it is neutral and generally applicable. In the table, only Ordinance Q both covers all slaughter (it does not single out religious ceremonies) and has no secular exemptions. Ordinance P covers only slaughter performed as part of a religious ceremony, so it targets religion and is not neutral (compare Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 1993). Ordinances R and S exempt some secular slaughter but not religious slaughter, so they are not generally applicable and would face strict scrutiny. Public support and the year a law was enacted do not matter under this test.
Why the other 3 choices miss
A
Misreads the table by focusing on Ordinance P's high public support and early enactment date. Its 'Activity covered' column shows it reaches only slaughter performed in religious ceremonies, so it targets religion and is not neutral under Smith.
C
Notices that Ordinance R covers all slaughter and has strong public support, but misses its 5 secular exemptions. A law that exempts comparable secular conduct while refusing religious exemptions is not generally applicable.
D
Treats a single secular exemption as too small to matter. Even one secular exemption means Ordinance S does not apply to everyone equally, so it is not generally applicable and the Smith rule does not protect it.
Example 2Harder
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects religious practice from government interference. Following Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which standard applies when a neutral, generally applicable law incidentally burdens religious practice?
  1. AThe government must demonstrate a compelling interest and use the least restrictive means to justify any burden on religion
  2. BAny law that substantially burdens a sincere religious practice is automatically unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause
  3. CNeutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religion need only satisfy rational basis reviewCorrect
  4. DThe burden on religious practice must be so substantial as to amount to a direct prohibition before the courts will intervene

Why C is right

In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religious practice do not violate the Free Exercise Clause and need only satisfy rational basis review. The heightened scrutiny standard (from Sherbert v. Verner) was limited to individualized exemption systems.
Why the other 3 choices miss
A
This was the pre-Smith standard from Sherbert v. Verner; Smith lowered the bar for neutral, generally applicable laws.
B
Automatic unconstitutionality was rejected in Smith; courts distinguish between targeted laws directed at religion (unconstitutional) and neutral laws with incidental religious burdens (generally constitutional).
D
Courts do not require a near-total prohibition on practice; even substantial incidental burdens from neutral laws are constitutionally permissible under Smith.

Studied alongside

Other concepts from Civil Liberties and Civil Rights.