The table shows hypothetical data on five congressional districts in a state's newly adopted redistricting plan. The compactness score ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating a more compact, regularly shaped district.
| District | Compactness score | Minority share of voting-age population (%) | Share of boundary following county or city lines (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.48 | 57 | 81 |
| 2 | 0.08 | 54 | 12 |
| 3 | 0.06 | 18 | 15 |
| 4 | 0.41 | 22 | 77 |
| 5 | 0.11 | 31 | 64 |
Based on the data and the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno (1993), which district would be most vulnerable to a constitutional challenge, and why?
- ADistrict 1, because it has the largest minority share of the voting-age population of any district in the plan
- BDistrict 2, because its irregular shape ignores local boundaries and its population is majority-minorityCorrect
- CDistrict 3, because it is the least compact district in the plan and rarely follows any county or city lines
- DDistrict 5, because it combines a low compactness score with a substantial minority population
Why B is right
Shaw v. Reno held that a district so irregular in shape that it can be explained only as an effort to separate voters by race may violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the table, District 2 is the only district that combines a very low compactness score (0.08), a boundary that largely ignores county and city lines (only 12%), and a majority-minority population (54%), so race is the most plausible explanation for its shape. District 1 is majority-minority but compact and follows local lines; District 3 is irregular but has a small minority share, pointing to a non-racial (for example, partisan) explanation; District 5's shape largely tracks county and city lines.
Why the other 3 choices miss
- A
- Misreads the standard: a majority-minority population alone does not trigger Shaw. District 1 is fairly compact (0.48) and follows local boundaries for 81% of its length, so its shape does not suggest race predominated.
- C
- Focuses only on shape: District 3 is the least compact, but its minority share is just 18%, so its irregularity is not evidence of race-based line drawing and points to some other motive such as partisanship.
- D
- Overlooks the boundary column: District 5's low compactness is largely explained by traditional districting principles, since 64% of its boundary follows county or city lines, and its 31% minority share is not majority-minority.
The table shows hypothetical data on incumbents in the U.S. House of Representatives who ran for reelection in a single election cycle, grouped by how competitive their districts were.
| District type | Incumbents running | Incumbents reelected | Avg. incumbent spending ($ millions) | Avg. challenger spending ($ millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Safe | 250 | 247 | 1.6 | 0.2 |
| Leaning | 120 | 106 | 2.7 | 0.9 |
| Toss-up | 30 | 18 | 4.3 | 3.6 |
| All districts | 400 | 371 | 2.1 | 0.7 |
Which of the following statements is supported by the data in the table?
- AIncumbents in toss-up districts had the largest spending advantage over their challengers.
- BMore incumbents lost in leaning districts than in toss-up districts.Correct
- CIncumbents in leaning districts lost at a higher rate than incumbents in toss-up districts.
- DFewer than 90 percent of all incumbents running in this cycle were reelected to the House.
Why B is right
Subtract reelected from running to get the number of incumbents who lost. That is 3 in safe districts (250 - 247), 14 in leaning districts (120 - 106), and 12 in toss-up districts (30 - 18). So more incumbents lost in leaning districts than in toss-up districts, even though toss-up incumbents lost at a much higher rate (40% vs. about 12%). Overall, 371 of 400 incumbents (about 93%) won. Most of them ran in safe districts where challengers spent very little, which fits the incumbency advantage that comes from favorable district lines and a fundraising edge. The spending gap between incumbents and challengers was smallest in toss-up districts, not largest.
Why the other 3 choices miss
- A
- This confuses total spending with the gap. Toss-up incumbents spent the most ($4.3M), but their edge over challengers ($0.7M) was the smallest. Leaning incumbents had the largest edge ($1.8M), and safe incumbents had $1.4M.
- C
- This confuses counts with rates. Leaning districts had more losses (14), but they had more incumbents running, so their loss rate was 14/120 (about 12%). In toss-up districts it was 12/30 (40%).
- D
- Of the 400 incumbents who ran, 371 were reelected, about 93%. That is above 90%, which fits the usual high incumbency reelection rate.