The table shows hypothetical data on where senior officials from five federal regulatory agencies worked within two years of leaving their posts.
| Agency | Senior officials departing | Joined firms in the industry the agency regulates (%) | Registered as lobbyists (%) | Took other public-sector posts (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agency P | 100 | 58 | 22 | 15 |
| Agency Q | 80 | 31 | 9 | 44 |
| Agency R | 150 | 64 | 30 | 6 |
| Agency S | 60 | 25 | 6 | 51 |
| Agency T | 300 | 40 | 15 | 30 |
Critics warn that when regulators expect to be hired by the firms they oversee, they may favor those firms while still in office. Based on the data, which agency's departing officials show the LARGEST proportion of the movement those critics are worried about?
- AAgency R, because larger shares of its departing officials joined firms in the industry it regulates and registered as lobbyists than at any other agencyCorrect
- BAgency T, because it had more departing senior officials than any other agency listed in the table
- CAgency S, because the largest share of its departing officials moved into other public-sector posts
- DAgency P, because its share joining the regulated industry was more than double its public-sector share
Why A is right
The critics' concern describes the 'revolving door': officials leave government for jobs in the industries they regulated, or for lobbying, and the hope of being hired may lead them to favor those firms while still in office. In the table, the relevant columns are 'Joined firms in the industry the agency regulates' and 'Registered as lobbyists.' Agency R has the highest percentage in both (64% and 30%), so its departing officials show the largest proportion of this movement. Agency T's larger total, Agency S's moves to other public-sector posts, and Agency P's ratio do not measure the share of officials passing through the revolving door as well as Agency R's figures do.
Why the other 3 choices miss
- B
- This mixes up the total number of departures with the share of departures. Agency T had the most departing officials (300), but only 40% joined the regulated industry and 15% registered as lobbyists. Agency R's shares are much higher.
- C
- Agency S does have the highest public-sector share (51%), but moving to another government post is not movement from government into the regulated industry or lobbying. Agency S actually has the lowest shares in those columns (25% and 6%).
- D
- The claim is accurate (58% vs. 15%), but it does not answer the question. Agency R beats Agency P in both of the relevant columns: 64% vs. 58% joining the regulated industry and 30% vs. 22% registering as lobbyists.
The table shows hypothetical data on federal officials who left government service in a single year and what they did within two years of leaving.
| Former position | Number who left | % who registered as lobbyists | % employed by a firm in an industry they had overseen |
|---|---|---|---|
| House members | 50 | 42 | 30 |
| Senators | 20 | 55 | 35 |
| Senior committee staff | 300 | 28 | 47 |
| Executive agency regulators | 500 | 9 | 61 |
| Cabinet-level officials | 15 | 20 | 53 |
Which of the following statements is best supported by the data in the table?
- AFormer agency regulators were the least likely group to register as lobbyists but the most likely to work for an industry they had overseen.Correct
- BFormer agency regulators made rulings that favored the industries that later hired them, as shown by their high rate of employment in those industries.
- CMore former senators than former House members registered as lobbyists within two years of leaving office.
- DFormer senior committee staff registered as lobbyists at a higher rate than former members of either chamber did.
Why A is right
The table illustrates the 'revolving door': officials leave government for lobbying or for jobs in the industries they used to oversee. Reading the lobbying column, executive agency regulators have the lowest rate of any group (9%). Reading the industry-employment column, they have the highest rate (61%, above cabinet officials' 53% and committee staff's 47%). Their route through the revolving door is mostly direct industry employment, not registered lobbying. Choice A is the only statement that matches both columns. The other choices confuse rates with counts, read the wrong rows, or claim causation the data cannot show.
Why the other 3 choices miss
- B
- This is an unsupported causal leap. The table shows only where former regulators went to work (61%). It has no data on how they ruled while in office, so it cannot show that their decisions favored their future employers.
- C
- This confuses a percentage with a count. Senators had the higher lobbying rate (55% vs. 42%), but only 11 of 20 senators registered, compared with 21 of 50 House members, so more House members became lobbyists.
- D
- This reads the wrong rows. Committee staff registered at 28%, which is lower than both House members (42%) and senators (55%).